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ABSTRACT
NICHOLAS JAMES GREENE: Advice’s Effect: The Role of Western Advisors on
Russian Privatization Policy
(Under the direction of Andrew Young)
This paper seeks to investigate the role that western advisors played in Russia’s transition
to a market economy during the 1990s. In order to answer this question a wide variety
of sources were consulted. Scholarly papers, books on the subject, and works by the
participants themselves all played. Through my investigation it became clear that
advisors played little, if any, role in influencing policy. A host of domestic ideas and
political factors were far more important in determining what strategy was pursued.
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Introduction
This paper will examine a very specific question concerning the role that foreign
advisors played in shaping the course of Russian privatization. Specifically, it will
describe how Russians plotted their own course on the subject of privatization policy.
Western advice was certainly present during the period, and much of it did
recommend policies that were eventually adopted. However,those who suggest that
Russians were pushed into adopting the “Washington Consensus” would do well to
examine the evidence presented in this thesis.
This paper will, through a series of chapters, build up the proper supporting
evidence for the statements made above. The first chapter will consider just what the
term “privatization” means. Chapter two will provide an overview of privatization
history, as well as an explanation ofthe “Washington Consensus”. Chapter three charts
the path of Russia’s reforms, across the years from 1992 to the ruble crisis on August 17,
1998. Chapter four details the various advice and conditionality given by westerners
during that period. It also seeks to determine how great an influence the advice had on
Russians policymakers. Chapter five contains conclusions from my research.

Chapter 1: Privatization; definition and justification

In order to carry on a meaningful investigation of privatization policy, the term
itself must be defined. There have been numerous suggestions put forth over the years.
Thomas Biersteker, in a 1990 article for International Studies Quarterly, lists
privatization as a three part effort, characterized by the divestiture or selling off of parts
of the public sector; sub-contracting or eliminating public sector services; and the
creating of incentives for private sector development, e.g., tax incentives and an increased
private sector role in agriculture (Biersteker, 486). Dr. Madsen Pirie, the head of
England’s Adam Smith Institute and a leading British writer on the subject, defines
privatization as,“not a method but an approach. It is an approach which sees no
substitute for the market to the reality itself’(Pirie, 11-12).
During British privatization, for instance, a normal pattern of“shaping up”
companies to get them ready for the market was followed. Frequently, many ofthe
painful changes (layoffs, plant closures, price hikes, etc.) which would have been made
necessary by the market were done while the firm was still under government control.
This was justified by the need to get the best price once the company in question
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offered. This process ofreform could last one to two years. In contrast, many
participants in the Russian privatization process tended to focus on events, most notably
voucher auctions. The mere fact ofselling shares in an enterprise would, it was believed,
usher in all the necessary changes that in England had been conducted by government as
part ofthe privatization process. These events, voucher auctions primarily, were
perceived as transforming a state owned firm into a private one.
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Sir Alfred Sherman, a senior Thatcher advisor, chooses to define privatization not
by the ownership of an enterprise itself. Instead, he focuses on how competitive a
particular market is. Only when corporations that were formerly public are forced to
compete can they be said to have been privatized. In the wake ofshare sales in the
“natural monopolies” he goes so far as to say that without competition, the ownership of
an enterprise is irrelevant. The following quote comes from a paper by John Burton in
Managerial and Decision Economics(the original quote appeared in the Financial
Weekly).
Insofar as public monopoly is turned into a private monopoly,the state remains
there because the monopoly is guaranteed by the state. It is merely the state
disguised as private. Insofar as that is the case we haven’t had privatization
(Burton, 22).
This definition seems overly stringent, although using a traditional microeconomic
framework it is not unreasonable. It is interesting to consider that this, the requirement of
a strong competition policy and the negative effects oflacking one, is a criticism that will
crop up again later in regards to the Russian program.
Writing in Privatizing Russia. Boyco, Shleifer, and Vishny develop a
comprehensive model to demarcate who really controls a firm based on a pair of rights .
The first is the right of control, i.e., the right to decide what the enterprise will produce or
do. The second is the right to cash flow,i.e., the right to profit or lose from the firm s
success or failure. Within this model, any person or group may have authority over either
one or both ofthese rights. When describing privatization, Boyco et. al. say,“The
allocation to the managers of control rights that once belonged to politicians is known as
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corporatization; the allocation to them, as well as outside investors, of cash flow rights is
known as privatization” (Boyco, Shleifer, and Vishny, 50). Based on this definition any
firm in which both the right to control and profit has been removed fi'om the hands ofthe
state can be said to have been privatized. Unfortunately, this definition cannot be
adopted without qualification, due to the propensity ofthe Russian state to retain large
shares of ownership in corporations that it “privatized.” While ostensibly the government
became a minority shareholder like any other, in many cases the effect was far fi'om
simple.
For this paper, the definition put forward by John Burton, Research Director for
the Institute of Economic Affairs(London) will be adopted. Writing in Managerial and
Decision Economics he defines privatization as “any measure by which transfers to
private ownership of previously govemmentally-owned resources occurs”(Burton, 22).
This should not be confused with any other definition which appeared in same paper,
such as the one cited above fi'om Sir Alfi'ed Sherman.
The term “mass privatization” should be taken to describe some form of large
scale transfer of property to the citizenry. The most common example of such a move is
the Russian voucher privatization program of 1992-1994, although others could be
considered as well. Mass privatization exists in contrast to case by case privatization,
where individual enterprises are sold, usually in the form ofstock tenders.
The term "western advisor" should be interpreted to describe a select group of
western economists, bankers, and development experts who held actual and quasi
governmental advisory posts during the period from the August 11, 1991 coup attempt on
Gorbachev until the August 19, 1998 currency collapse. This group includes, but was not
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limited to, Jeffery Sachs, Andrei Shliefer, Jonathan Hays, Anders Aslnnd, Richard
Layard, and Stanley Fischer. Any following reference to western advisors is intended to
refer to those individuals and their contemporaries. Any influence that western ideas,
e.g., classical economic theory, may or may not have generally had on Russian
policymakers is beyond the scope ofthis paper.
What arguments are put forward to justify privatization? There is a standard set
of explanations for why privatization should be followed. Below are a few ofthe
justifications and supporting arguments as presented by various authors on the subject.
In their work Kremlin Capitalism, Blasi, Krumova, and Kruse address just this
point. Within a section titled “Why was privatization necessary?” they give two main
reasons. First, the economy was collapsing. During the period from the August 19, 1991
coup attempt against Gorbachev until the freeing of prices on January 2, 1992 the
Russian people and state had been living in a period ofextreme uncertainty and a steady
acceleration of disintegrating state control. Because ofthe peculiar nature of Soviet
industrialization these problems were exacerbated. The Soviet state had consciously
pursued a policy of building very large projects, both to capture economies of scale and
as propaganda showpieces. These massive factories were, at least in some cases, not
situated conveniently to their suppliers. Enterprises found themselves now across borders
from their previously domestic suppliers and customers. Closer to home, at least for
those in Moscow, was an impending food shortage. Yegor Gaidar, Deputy Prime
Minister under Yeltsin, goes to great length to emphasize the dire nature of the situation.
A whole chapter in his book on the period is entitled, “The terrible winter of Ninty-one”
(Gaidar, 128). Having shown that Russia was in desperate need of radical action, they
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argue that only the freeing of prices and creation of a market could hope to return food to
the shelves. It was believed that the only way to fundamentally solve the problem was
through the discipline, cost cutting, and austerity that only new private owners could
hope to bring.
Blasi, Krumova,and Kruse list as the second reason the fact that legitimate
privatization had to be conducted quickly to stop “nomeklatura privatization,

That is.

illegal seizures by enterprise directors in the name of privatization (Blasi, Krumova,
Kruse, 26-35). In the absence of previously controlling central agencies - Gosplan, the
Union-wide planning authority, for instance - many enterprise managers were running
their firms for their own personal interest.
The director of a Soviet enterprise was a peculiar creature. He(they were almost
exclusively men) was responsible for managing his production unit in order to fulfill a
target amount set by the Union-wide five year plan. Due to the nature ofthe Soviet
system, these managers had almost no experience with marketing or sales. In the Soviet
system, it was not the manager’s responsibility to sell but simply to produce and fulfill the
plan quota assigned to him. In fact, the only experience with markets of any sort was
either the black markets where managers bartered for supplies during the 1970s and
1980s or the tightly controlled foreign trade conducted by the Soviet government.
Furthermore, the Soviet system also made enterprises responsible for providing many of
the services which westerners traditionally associate with local government or other more
specialized private sector firms. Some examples include housing, schools, hospitals, and
vacation resorts. The privatization oflarge industrial firms did not coincide with a
similar shift of those responsibilities to government and other private firms. Instead
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newly privatized firms, many struggling to remain in operation, had to continue trying to
supply the services their communities depended on.
Enterprise directors, who had previously only been asked to fulfill state imposed
production quotas, were forced by the fall ofcommunism to confront a highly chaotic
environment for which their previous training had not prepared them. Their responses
varied from breathless demands for government assistance to outright theft from the
properties they managed. The rent-seeking behavior is not surprising, particularly in a
legal environment that was almost entirely ineffective, such as the one which persisted in
Russia during the period. Reformers believed that, by transferring power into the hands
oflegitimate owners with a financial stake in responsible management, enterprise
directors could be disciplined or removed. Unfortunately, a variety oflater events would
conspire to prevent this rosy forecast from occurring.
Thane Gustafson, a Georgetown University government professor and the author
of Capitalism Russian Style, also supports this second reason for why privatization had to
occur in Russia. He says, “privatization policy hurriedly put together to head off a
massive wildcat privatization from below”(Gustafson, 26). This “wildcat privatization
was coming in the form of asset seizures and sales by those who lacked title but retained
authority, namely enterprise directors. Managers were also known then, and even much
later, to use tolling contracts(a contract which covers the marginal cost of production but
doesn’t take into the price the need for future capital expenditures), captive subsidiaries
and suspect deals with family and friends to extract value from the enterprises which they
had been trusted to manage.
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Anders Aslund,in his work How Russia became a Market Economy, says that
privatization policy was driven by the twin goals of creating real meaningful property
rights, and preventing any more “nomenklatura privatization”. During the Soviet period,
the term nomenklatura was used to describe high level managers and directors in the state
and party. “Nomenklatura privatization” refers to the illegal seizure of state-owned
assets by the senior managers or bureaucrats that had previously been responsible for
administering them. Above all else, Aslund says,“The Russian privatizers never forgot
that the ultimate purpose of privatization was to create a market,”(Aslund, 231-232).
The trio of Boyco, Shliefer, and Vishny provide another set ofjustifications in
their book Privatizing Russia. They argue that privatization was based on three
fundamental beliefs among those making policy. First, that Russians would respond to
economic incentives the same way that westerners did. Put in the jargon ofthe time;
homo sovieticus was actually the same as homo economicus.
The second idea they identify is that the cause of economic inefficiency in Russia
was caused by political interference in the rational decision making offirms.
Furthermore, they identified privatization as the most effective way to combat the
influence of politicians. This same process has also been identified by the name ‘de
politicization.’
The final impetus they identify was the overall need to manage the relationship
between stakeholders in the present system and their future roles. Boyco, Shleifer, and
Vishny are quick to note that while the state officially owned these firms, by the end of
the Soviet period they were hardly the only group making decisions. The need to
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manage, co-opt, and prevent further damage from other actors within the system is
identified as a final influence on privatization policy.
All the above quotes and references present a clear pattern for why privatization
was recommended as a reform strategy. Western advisors, and in some cases Russian
politicians and technocrats, believed that the quickest way to a market economy, and the
only way to entrench democracy and capitalism, was to give everyone a stake in success
of the new system. By selling off state property they hoped to impose rational and
effective management,to prevent unjust seizures by present stakeholders, and to create a
meaningful and open society of owners. This final goal will re-appear in the next
chapter, which examines the historical underpinnings of the Russian experience.
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Chapter Two: Privatization History and the Washington Consensus

This chapter will specifically focus on the intellectual underpinnings of
privatization during the period leading up to Russia’s great experiment with it. While the
thesis of this paper concerns the specific nature of Russian privatization and the role
played by outside advisors, this chapter will take a broader view. Considering
privatization, there was a widely accepted set of policy procedures known as the
“Washington Consensus.” This orthodox model was seen, at least at the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as applicable in a wide variety of situations. This set
of policy procedures included privatization as a key component. However, it should be
noted that in some cases privatization was conducted entirely on the initiative of national
leaders, without overt specific pressure fi*om lenders.
The first great “experiment” in privatization began in England. Conventional
wisdom tells us that Margaret Thatcher swept into office in 1979 and embarked upon a
systematic program of sales and changes which transformed Britain from an ailing nation
of striking, grasping trade unionists into a productively humming metropolis peopled by
productive home owners and shareholders.
There is solid support for some of this version of history. Madsen Pirie, head of
the Adam Smith Institute, says, “Britain has set a firm lead in most areas,”(Pirie, 12-13).
John Burton, Research Director at the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, agrees
saying,“This ‘Thatcher experiment’ would appear to have acted as a political-economic
demonstration effect, causing a wave of imitative privatization policy developments
around the world”(Burton, 22). Ascui, McAllister, and Studlar, writing in Political
Science, similarly argue that, “other political parties and governments, not only in the

10

Western world but also in the Third world and even the Communist states, remain keenly
interested in the experience of Britain as a privatization leader”(Ascui, McAllister,
Studlar, 1078). A final verdict comes from G.S. Gupta, who writes,“Britain took the
lead in privatization in 1979, and many countries followed her in due course”(Gupta,
26).
While some nations did chose to pursue privatization on their own initiative, they
were vastly outnumbered by programs implemented at the “suggestion” of the World
Bank,IMF,EBRD,and other multilateral lending institutions. These institutions do not
strictly require privatization measures, but the IMF included divesture of enterprises to
the private sector in 29 percent of its programs between 1980 and 1984 (Feinburg, 550).
Privatization, particularly when conducted as a part of World Bank and IMF
programs rarely comes as the sole policy recommendation. Usually a variety of policy
measures are sought by multilateral lenders. While these additional policy
recommendations are beyond the scope of this paper, it is still worthwhile to note them.
By understanding the “normal” package ofreforms, the reader can better appreciate the
role that privatization plays.
This package of policies has become known as the “the Washington Consensus”;
supported by the US-led development community,it provided a series of prescriptions
that, it was believed, would be appropriate in a wide variety of situations. Biersteker, in
his 1990 International Studies Quarterly article, lists four common components to World
Bank and IMF led reforms: currency devaluation and market determined exchange rates;
anti-inflationary demand management; the restoration or creation of domestic and
Those seeking more information on privatization around the world in the years before 1992, should see
appendix one.
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import/export market mechanisms; and finally privatization (Biersteker, 484-485). Sayre
Schatz, a Temple University economist, is less explicit in his characterization of
commonality, relying on the term “laissez-fairism.

He loosely describes “laissez-

fairism” as free market pricing and exchange rates, reduced tariffs, and privatization
(Schatz, 129).
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner and former chief economist ofthe World
Bank says, “Fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization were the three pillars
of Washington Consensus advice throughout the 1980s and 1990s”(Stiglitz, 53). Stiglitz
also provides a brief history lesson, detailing how the three-pillared approach was
developed to confront the Latin American debt crises ofthe 1980s. He is even willing to
stipulate that the programs suggested for those limited circumstances were helpful. What
Stiglitz criticizes is the blanket application ofthose policies to nations all over the globe,
including Russia. Another criticism of his is the perceived unwillingness ofthe IMF and
World Bank to acknowledge national differences, accept variations from their orthodoxy,
and/or recognize the importance of the sequencing and overall timing of actions (Stiglitz,
16-17, 53-54).
An interesting example ofthe connection from Latin America in the 1980s to
Russia in the 1990s can be seen in the person of Professor Jeffrey Sachs. This Harvard
economist helped to develop and advance many ofthe policies used to fight hyper
inflation in Latin America. This paper’s bibliography includes one such example, a 1987
paper he presented on Bolivian hyperinflation and the methods for fighting it. Five years
later he would be an economic advisor to Yegor Gaidar, the technocrat and Deputy Prime
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Minister most responsible for designing Yeltsin’s first economic reform package
(Goldman,59).
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Chapter 3: Russian Economic Transformation
This chapter will seek to describe the fundamental shifts that occurred within the
Russian economy as it transitioned from a command and control/centrally planned
economy to a fi-ee market capitalistic model. Privatization played an important part in
this transition; however,it was part of a larger network of policy strategies. This chapter
will not focus on analysis, but rather will seek to familiarize readers with events and
create a framework for the specific advice which is to be presented later.
The point at which Russian economic reform,including privatization, actually
began is ofsome dispute. The “shock therapy” reforms of Yegor Gaidar and Boris
Yeltsin began on January 2, 1992. However, these were far from the first attempts to
reform or restructure the Soviet/Russian economy. Nor,in fact, were they the first
attempts to include privatization amongst those reform policies. The beginmng ofthe
reform effort which would lead to Yeltsin’s 1992 plan started with the economic reforms
of Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev, serving as General Secretary ofthe Communist Party
of Soviet Union from March 11, 1985 to December 25, 1991, sought to re-invigorate and
jump start the Soviet Union. Glasnost and Perestroika are well known terms, and their
impact, although not necessarily in the way Gorbachev intended, was huge.
As early as 1988 he was edging the system towards a more open and competitive
market. His cooperative laws essentially legalized private business, and through a string
of reforms over the next year, he allowed privatization ofsome apartments as well as the
leasing of state enterprises and agricultural lands (Blasi, Krumova, Kruse, 19). As early
as July, 1990 Graham Allison, former Director of Harvard’s Kennedy School of
Government and author of Essence of Decision, was suggesting in the New York Times
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that Washington extend technical assistance for “the transition to a market economy,
privatization of state assets, reform ofindustrial ministries, and decolonization”(Allison,
New York Times Sec A Pg 16, July 5,1990).
A variety of plans were proposed by Soviet economics professionals, ’Most
significant were the proposals by Lenoid Abalkin, Stamslav Shatalin, and Grigori
Yavlinksy”(Klien and Pomer, 154). These three men were noted Soviet economists
working at a variety of prestigious institutes around Moscow. Abalkin served in a variety
of government posts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as Director ofthe Institute
of Economics of the Academy of Sciences. Shatalin was a chief Gorbachev economic
advisor as well as responsible for directing the research activities ofthe Politburo
Commission on Improvement of Management Systems(Aslund 321, 324 and Gaidar,
26).
The plans prepared by them had at least three factors in common: improving
government finance, dealing with the ruble overhang (the excess of savings that only
existed because oflack of goods or capital convertibility), and enlarging private
enterprise. Their plans differed in detail. For instance, Abalkin supported controlled and
limited privatization, while Shatalin and Yavlinsky were in favor of more rapid change
(Klein and Pomer, 154-155).
Some ofthese plans found wide support in portions of the Soviet government.
“In September 1990 the Russian Supreme Soviet approved a radical plan to transform the
Soviet economy [the Shatalin plan] 213 to 1”(Blasi, Krumova, Kruse 19). During the
summer of 1991,“a State Property Fund was set up to handle privatization”(Aslund, 30).
That vote was followed up in December of 1990 by the approval of a “law on enterprises
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and entrepreneurial activity”(Klien and Pomer, 155). Blasi writes “As a result of
Gorbachev’s enterprise reforms, some economic experimentation was going on at the
beginning ofthe 1990s. However,the scope of Gorbachev’s tentative steps would soon
be dwarfed by those of a former colleague, Boris Yeltsin.
1991 marked a year of great uncertainty and upheaval within the USSR. Forces,
both political and economic, had been imleashed that were beyond anyone’s control. A
May 30 New York Times story quotes Yevgeny Primakov, a high level Gorbachev advisor
saying,“What is called for is primarily liberalization, privatization, destatization...

On

July 24 the same paper carried a story announcing that the Soviet Union expected to sell a
thirty percent stake in VAZ(a large car manufacturer) to Fiat of Italy. Two weeks later,
on August 19, a group of hardliners from the security forces and the military attempted to
seize power. Gorbachev, then on vacation in the Crimea, was briefly placed under house
arrest during the coup. The defense ofthe government by Yeltsin provided him the
popular support necessary to mount his October appeal for special powers and radical
reform.
On October 28, 1991, Boris Yeltsin delivered a speech detailing his economic
proposals to Russia’s legislative body. The speech, the work of Yegor Gaidar, called for
a program of radical reform, inspired by Poland’s “shock therapy.” The Congress was
also asked to grant Yeltsin the power to rule by degree, in order to implement the
program. The power to issue decrees was granted.
Yeltsin then proceeded to create a government to implement his reforms. This
group included the already mentioned Gaidar, as Deputy Prime Minister, and Anatoly
Chubais as Privatization Minister. Chubias had previously worked with Gaidar while
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working on developing Soviet era reform plans (Gaidar, 27). Both ofthese men would
play large roles in following years.
On December 25,1991 the hammer and sickle flag of the USSR was lowered
from the Kremlin for the final time. The first phase in Gaidar’s reform plan was a freeing
on prices within the economy. On January 2, 1992 the Russian government did that for
80 percent of wholesale goods and 90 percent ofretail prices (Brani, 30). Aslund wrote,
“the main reform package, which emphasized price liberalization and financial
stabilization, was launched at the beginning of 1992”(Aslund, 54). Those two moves are
highly characteristic ofthe Washington Consensus policy package discussed in chapter
two. Privatization, the third pillar identified by Joseph Stiglitz, would follow within the
year.
On why the pace ofreform had to be set so high Gaidar writes, “Putting off
liberalization of the economy until slow structural reforms could be enacted was
impossible. Two or three more months ofsuch passivity and we would have economic
and political catastrophe, total collapse, and civil war. I was convinced of it”(Gaidar,
114). He also goes to great lengths in his book on the period to present the dire situation
of the government as it pertained to food. He says that the government believed that, at
the pace they were using grain, they would not have enough to last until the next harvest.
The reforms, which were blamed for hyperinflation and the rapid rise in retail
prices, were immensely unpopular. The Congress ofPeople’s Deputies sitting at this
time was still made up of communist holdovers almost exclusively. In order to appease
unhappy members “Yeltsin allowed three enterprise managers to become deputy prime
ministers between May and June 1992(Aslund, 54). The need for political compromise
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becomes obvious in the main privatization law, which was signed into law on June 11,
1992. This law is perceived by many as a deeply flawed document,including its creator,
Yegor Gaidar. The point of conflict between the two factions, and the political deal made
to preserve the reform drive, are discussed in detail below.
The goals ofthe main privatization effort were two fold. The basic economic
belief, widely held by both western advisors and Russian reformers, was that placing the
enterprises in private hands would lead to more responsible management,less waste, and
ultimately economic growth (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 48-49).
The second goal, as expressed by Gaider and Chubais, was to insure that
communists could never return to power. On May 3 1992 Gaidar is quoted in the New
York Times,“The most important thing is to privatize as rapidly as possible and to try to
create a property structure that would be regarded by society as more or less just, that will
not create a terrible redistributionary conflict that will undermine political stability.” Put
more simply, Chubais said at a press conference in January 1993,“if we are victories in
the first half of the year, it will be enough to make the process irreversible”(Brady, 76).
The perceived necessity of sales at any cost forced the reformers to accept a compromise
plan.^
The main issue of contention among reformers was the amount of the enterprise
(in terms of percentage of stock ownership)to leave in hands ofthe current management
and workers. The goal was to leave just enough stock in the hands of management and
workers to provide them with incentives and to ensure their support in the privatization

^ It is also worth contrasting the Russian political situation with that of Britain during its pioneering
privatizations. While Ms. Thatcher was concerned that her privatizations not be reversed she did not have
to fear that the entire structure of her government and economy could be dismantled at the stroke of a pen.
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program. The original proposal, 25 percent of enterprises non-voting stock would have
been given to insiders. Another 15 percent of voting stock would have been available at
discount. Whatever was left over would be sold in voucher auctions by Chubais’s
property fund (Goldman, 80). Enterprise directors, almost without exception, did not
support any plan which would have taken control oftheir firms from them and given it to
outsiders. Through their relationships with the still largely commumst legislature, they
were able to pressure the government into offering additional options to firms.
Under the second variant eventually accepted, insiders would be allowed to
purchase up to 51 percent of any enterprise at 1.7 times book value, as of July 1,1992
(Goldman, 81). Furthermore, insiders were eventually allowed to fulfill up to 80 percent
of their purchase price with vouchers. This second option proved the most popular, with
75 percent of all firms choosing it. The final option allowed insiders to receive 20
percent gratis, with the rights to purchase more at below par over the next three years.
Roughly 5 percent offirms chose it. The Russian ruble was at this time experiencing
roughly 26 percent inflation per month. This extraordinarily high rate served to discount
almost any price, including the 1.7 time multiple of share price fixed in the second
privatization option.
This solution was far from what the reformers and their western advisor allies
wanted. Goldman describes the second variant as a,“surrender to the plant directors, a
price Gaidar apparently had to pay for support in the Supreme Soviet for the passage of
his privatization legislation”. He goes on to add,“Gaidar admits that the concession on
Variant two was a mistake”(Goldman, 81).
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Figure 1 shows effects of inflation on purchasing power ofthe ruble when
measured each December using a basket of consumer goods. With 1990 fixed as a base
year and a value of 100 rubles used, the chart shows how many rubles would have been
necessary to buy the same basket of goods in each proceeding year. The figure does not
take into account currency reform, which removed a number ofzeros over the years.
While this figure does illustrate the extent ofinflation, it is important to remember that in
1990 having rubles was not enough to be able to buy things because the Soviet Union
was at the peak of its shortage economy. The data for the chart below comes from
Marshall Goldman’s book The Piratization of Russia. Professor Goldman is an emeritus
professor of Russian economics at Wellesley College as well as Associate Director ofthe
Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian studies at Harvard.

Figure 1
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The decision to allow insiders to acquire their own enterprises for virtually
nothing was perceived as necessary to achieve passage of the privatization law. It meant
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I

that the “red directors” could retain a stranglehold on Russian industry. Far from the
economists’ goals of shareholder activism and responsible independent boards, Russia
was left with a world ofimpotent minority shareholders.
But that was all in the future. All that was known in 1992 was that voucher
auctions were coming. Even under the least generous option, 49 percent of enterprises
would have to be distributed in voucher auctions. Fearing that a change in political
climate could end the whole process, reformers lead by Chubais, at this point head ofthe
state property fund, raced to complete the first deal before the seventh meeting ofPeoples
Deputies on December 1. They missed their deadline, but only by twelve days. On
December 13 The Bolshevik Biscuit Company earned a place in history as the first
Russian company to be privatized in a voucher auction. Over 44 percent ofthe enterprise
was sold to a variety to parties(Goldman, 89-90). This sale, unlike so many later, at least
shook up the enterprise in question. Within six months (July 7,1993)The New York
Times was reporting that a fecent shareholder’s meeting ofthe Bolshevik Biscuit
Factory broke into a pandemonium.”
Despite any biscuits which may or may not have gotten broken, the auctions
continued apace. By the end of June 1994, 15,052 large and medium sized enterprises
had been privatized. This had transferred over twenty one million workers from state
plants to private ones (Blasi, Krumova, and Kruse, 192). Whether anything actually
changed at many of the plants in question is another matter entirely. The state frequently
maintained a large minority position, and thanks to “option two” directors were rarely
forced out. Nevertheless, these enterprises had been privatized.
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Figures 2 and 3 provide graphical examples ofthat point. Each month shows the
number of voucher auctions that occurred each month. The chart below shows the total
and per month totals ofemployees shifted into the private sector via privatization. Both
charts were created with data fi*om Table 5.1 (Pg. 106-107) of Boyco, Shleifer, and
Vishny’s book Privatizing Russia.
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Russia, despite the policy prescriptions of its western advisors, was at this time
pursuing a loose monetary policy. This policy was directed by Victory Gerashenko, who
was appointed as governor of the Russian Central Bank on July 17, 1992 (Blasi,
Krumova, and Kruse, XVII). A man of long Soviet banking experience, Brady describes
him as a “true believer in the state regulation of the economy” (Brady, 39).
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Jeffery Sachs wrote, “Victor Gerashenko may be the worst central bank governor of any
major coimtry in history” {Economist, 10/16/1993 pp. 90). Yegor Gaidar, for reasons that
are still unclear, initially supported his appointment. He has described that decision as
44

the most serious of my mistakes in 1992” (Goldman, 82).
The policy which western advisors and Russian reformers objected to so strongly

was the issuing of credits to industry and agriculture. At this point, the allies of the “red
directors" in the Supreme Soviet (the legislative branch of the government at this point)
were demanding relief from the tight monetary policy being pursed by the Gaidar
government. Washington Post Bureau chief David Hoffrnan says that “the parliament
had installed Victor Gerashchenko as chairman of the Central Bank” (Hoffrnan, 200). As
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a creature of parliament, Gerashchenko obliged his perceived bosses. He ordered over
350,000,000,000 rubles introduced into circulation between July and September 1992 in
the form of credits to agriculture and industry(Brady,40).
Western advisors active in Russia at this point did not support the policy of giving
credits, rightly seeing the inflationary danger it entailed. Writing in the magazine
National Interest Sachs says.
Unlike my experience in many other countries, such as Poland, little of what I
recommended was actually enacted. It wasn't pleasant being blamed for high
inflation and other ills that resulted from the very opposite ofthe advice-that
[Anders] Aslund and I were giving (such as when the Central Bank

ran a

disastrous hyperinflationary monetary policy in 1992 and 1993)(Sachs National
Interest online source).
Demands for credits to individual industrial enterprises were placing huge strains
on the Federal budget. Combine this with an almost total lack ofrespect for the law and
lax enforcement of tax regulations, and the government rapidly ran into trouble.
Vladimir Potanin, the oligarch responsible for Uneximbank(The Universal Export
Import Bank, also sometimes abbreviated as Oneximbank) proposed a solution. The new
program. ‘Loans for Shares” would have large banks like his loan the government frmds
to cover their tax shortfalls. Collateral for these loans would be some of the shares that
the government had retained in privatized firms. The program even allowed that if the
government did not pay back the loans, the banks would sell their stakes at auction, with
the government getting all the proceeds above the loan amount. “Invariably the banks
holding the collateral and conducting the auctions emerged as the winners at a price that
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seldom exceeded the price ofthe initial loan”(Goldnian, 120). Marshall Goldman
describes it as “larceny on a grand scale.” These rigged auctions served to move the
crown jewels ofthe Russian economy (oil and gas, mining, and national media)into the
hands of a few banking/industrial conglomerates.
The usual arguments, familiar from the voucher compromise, were presented to
justify these auctions as well. Boris Jordan, the former head of Credit Suisse First
Boston’s Moscow office, then manager ofthe Renaissance Fund, said.
You have to remember that every year until Yeltsin got reelected [1996],
everyone in this country, including me, was worried that the communists were
going to come back. I don’t believe they were thinking much farther than, the
communist risk must be taken out ofthe game. And that’s what they were
thinking about- they weren’t thinking about the economy!(Hoffrnan, 313)
Whatever the motivation, the results ofloans for shares were easy to see. Well coimected
insiders were able to acquire assets for a song. On November 17, 1995 Vladimir Potanin
won the loans for share auction his own bank was conducting to gain a 38 percent stake
in Norilsk Nickel. That stake cost him $171,100,000. The minimum bid allowed was
$171,000,000. Norilsk Nickel booked profits of over $1.2 billion that year alone. In
another, if possibly more brazen, example, Surgutneftgaz(a Siberian oil and gas firm)
management warned outsiders not to bid, and even went so far as to close the airport in
Surgut on the day ofthe auction (Hoffman, 315-318).
Whether government officials were right to be worried about the communist
threat cannot be known. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that their fears were
well founded. In 1992 the Gaidar government had been brought down by a recalcitrant
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communist Supreme Soviet(the legislature). In the beginning ofthe election season in
1996 Yeltsin was perceived as a lost cause. Zyuganov,the head ofthe revived
Communist Party, was the toast ofthe Febuary 1996 World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland. Chrystia Freeland, Moscow Bureau chieffor the Financial Times quotes
George Soros’s comment to Boris Berezovsky at Davos,“Boys [describing the reformers
and capitalists], your time is over. You’ve had a few good years but now your time is
up (Freeland, 192). Berezovsky himself was one ofthe more flamboyant oligarchs who
specialized in media and political machinations after making a fortune in the early
nineties through his association with the Avtovaz auto factory.
Yeltsin won re-election in 1996 on the back of an expensive and at times very
questionable election campaign. There would be no renationalizations, and the
communist threat appeared to have abated. However, the cost to the Russian economy,
political system, and the transition fi-om communism to a “normal” market economy was
staggeringly high. Following on the heels of this time of chaos and blatant corruption,
one would expect markets to react cautiously. Instead valuations all across the spectrum
of Russian assets soared.
The combination of systematic looting, massive tax fraud, and unending
government deficits finally pushed the Russian government over the edge on August 17,
1998. The earlier tax nonpayment issue had never really been resolved. Instead the
Russian government had been supporting itself through a series of short term bond issues
(the Russian acronyms for the two classes of bonds were GKO and OFZ). These short
term bonds (three and six month) paid huge rates of return. In addition to making it
extremely hard for private enterprises to borrow, these notes placed immense burdens on
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the federal budget. Eventually the combination ofrates and interest payments became
unsustainable.
In a move that was seen as much too late, the ruble was released from its dollar
peg on August 19,1998. Over the preceding six months the central government had
exhausted its reserves attempting to defend the ruble. The government responded to its
own virtual bankruptcy by suspending repayment on both domestic and foreign debt.
The predictable results occurred. Banks which had been making huge profits on the
GKO market, and which had large portfolio positions holding them were broken by the
repayment freeze. The ripples sent through the bEinking system served to destroy bank
after bank. This list included most ofthe oligarch’s banks, and caused the destruction of
at least the banking arms of oligarch controlled conglomerates Menatep, Most, Unexim,
SBS Agro, and others.
Many authors and commentators have sought to assess who was responsible for
setting and guiding policy in Russia during the post Soviet period. For example, Joseph
Stiglitz included a chapter entitled “Who lost Russia” in his book. Globalization and its
Discontents. Some argue that western advisors were responsible for designing and
implementing(some even argue controlling) the process of transition and reform. This
paper asks the more fundamental question; what influence did advisors have on the
process ofreform?
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Chapter Four: Advice
What role did western advice play in shaping Russian privatization policy in the
period from Yeltsin’s rise to the August 19 1998 currency collapse? From the evidence it
appears that Russians charted their own course. They accepted advice where it
conformed to domestic policymakers ideas and needs, but rejected it when it did not suit
them. Furthermore, when accepting assistance from westerners, policy makers
maintained control ofthe process. This view is not universally shared, and dissenting
opinions are included throughout this chapter. One example is anthropologist and
George Mason University Professor ofInternational Commerce and Policy Janine Wedel,
who blames “econolobbyists” for many of Russia’s problems today.
While not exclusively limited to privatization advice, one ofthe largest, and
potentially most restrictive, sources of advice from the west was the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The architect of Russia’s reform program, Yegor Gaidar, has
written extensively about Russia’s relationship with the fund, and what effect their advice
had on Russia’s policy. A member of Boris Yeltsin’s cabinet even before Yeltsin took
office, he briefly served as Prime Minister. The leader ofthe “kamikaze cabinet,” he is
widely credited as the architect ofthe 1992 shock therapy reform plan (which included
mass privatization).
Gaidar does not criticize the IMF for its role in the early stages of Russian reform,
saying that the organization was not designed to handle such a massive transformation
(Gaidar, 152). An unwillingness to blame the IMF for failing to do something he clearly
believes they never had any hope of accomplishing is present throughout the time he has
written and discussed his role in Russia’s transformation. This is a point he makes time
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and again, beginning with an American Economic Review article: “It is senseless to set up
essentially political tasks for the IMF and require the later to resolve them: the IMF,by
its nature, does not fit in this role”(Gaidar, 13).
He does offer some criticism for the handling ofthe ruble zone issue. This was
the question of whether the Commonwealth ofIndependent States(CIS) would retain a
common currency (the ruble) or would have individual national ones. The IMF was
initially in favor of holding the ruble zone together, but after seeing the chaos that having
15 central banks and one currency caused, they reversed course. He goes on to say. In
time, the IMF gained a much better imderstanding of post socialist problems and was able
to adapt to conditions here”(Gaidar, 153).
In 1997 Gaidar wrote concerning IMF actions of a later period, surroimding the
“Black Tuesday” of October 11, 1994. That date marked the first post stabilization
collapse ofthe ruble (Blasi, Krumova and Kruse, XVIII and Aslund, 320). Quite
contrary to traditional complaints about the tyranny ofIMF constraints, Gaidar says,“The
experience of the 1994 Russian economic policy [soft money]is one more piece of clear
evidence that any softening ofrequirements to a monetary program endangers the
borrower”(Gaidar, 15). Joseph Stiglitz agrees. He writes, “Russia knew, however, that
when it came to the inevitable charade in which IMF would threaten to cut off aid, Russia
would bargain hard, an agreement(not often fulfilled) would be reached, and the money
spigot opened up again” (Stiglitz, 155). At least in this context neither Gaidar nor Stiglitz
are willing to blame the IMF(an institution of western advisors),

This general attitude

is highly common; Russian leaders were willing to listen, but they followed their own
course whenever possible.
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A rancorous debate has come to surround the IMF’s role in assisting Russia’s
move to a private economy, an important component of which was privatization. Such
luminaries as Alan Greenspan and Joseph Stiglitz have criticized IMF policy
recommendations (Stiglitz, 133-165). Greenspan, in a 1997 speech that questioned the
pace and sequence of privatization said,“The essential structure of a market economy is
missing”(Greenspan, 3). This criticism can be at least partially answered by the fact that
Russian reformers were afraid if they did not move quickly enough to entrench capitalism
it would be erased.
This overriding need to both widen and deepen the appeal ofreform programs
cannot be overestimated. Time and again decisions were made by policy makers to
accept sub-optimal solutions in order to forestall a perceived threat to democracy and the
free market. A good example from earlier in this paper is the case of privatization variant
two. Variant two allowed enterprise insiders (directors and workers) to purchase 51
percent of share before they were ever offered to the public. While the purchasers were
required to purchase their shares (as opposed to variant one)they did so at inflation
eroded prices and with up to 80 percent vouchers. In order to co-opt red directors and
workers into supporting the program of privatization, a plan that was not the product of
advice and did not please even its own authors was supported. Another example is the
structure ofthe “loans for shares” auctions which were conducted in 1996. These
auctions were designed to fill budget shortfalls. While they served to give away highly
valuable assets for almost nothing, the needs to stop wage arrears and the political costs
of selling to foreigners meant that the auctions were perceived as a necessity.

30

The loans for shares plan was originally created by a pair of western investment
bankers: Boris Jordan and Steven Jennings. These men had served as advisors during
voucher privatization, and were then running their own investment firm. Renaissance
Capital. Vladimir Potanin, an oligarch, asked Jordan to come up with a way for the state
to raise money by using shares as collateral.
From this seed, the highly questionable auctions that were to follow were grown.
Hoffman says,“Jennings told me that he insisted (to Potanin) that the deals must be
completely transparent and open to international competition. If not, he(Jenmngs) said,
“it will be a disaster.” Jordan agreed, saying that Potanin took their paper “but destroyed
the concept”(Hoffinan, 306-307).
In retrospect, the damage which high speed privatization in the absence of strong
competition and legal environments can cause is clear. Whether this damage is greater
than that which would have occurred had, for instance, communists won the 1996
presidential election cannot be known. This fear, of a return of unreformed communists
to power, can be seen again and again as the underlying cause of policy decisions.
Stiglitz himself devotes a chapter of his work Globalization and its Discontents to
the problem of Russia’s transition and the IMF’s role within it. He says,“The IMF told
Russia to privatize as fast as possible”(Stiglitz, 157). Stiglitz goes on to list a m3oiad of
problems which he believes were caused by IMF conditions and advice leading Russia to
make bad policy decisions. This would certainly be a damning critique, ifit was clear
that Russian policy makers paid any heed to western advisors. Stiglitz himself says,
“Russia would bargain hard, an agreement(not often fulfilled) would be reached, and the
money spigot opened up again”(Stiglitz, 155).
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As early as 1994 IMF director Michel Camdessus said that steps Russia should
take include,“bankruptcy legislation, the commercialization and privatization of stateowned enterprises, and the breakup or regulation of monopolies”(Camdessus,IMF
website) Privatization was advised, but within the context of a list of suggestions, hardly
as the sole solution to all of Russia’s problems. In the same speech Camdessus also listed
as important changes tight fiscal policy, a liberalization of prices to bring them in line
with world prices and the creation of a social safety net.
As was noted earlier during the discussion of central bank policy a loose
monetary policy was pursed. Bankruptcy laws, both because ofthe statues that regulate
the process and the limitation ofthe court system, should still not be described as
reformed. Domestic prices, particularly of energy and raw materials, were not subjected
to international price discipline by the willingness offirms to accept each others debt, the
limitations of export quotas and the willingness of certain major suppliers (particularly
Gazprom)to accept barter payment or in many cases no payment at all for the delivery of
energy.
Instead of believing that Russia was bound by one piece ofIMF advice, while
ignoring all others, it seems at least as plausible to suggest that the imperative to privatize
quickly had nothing to do with IMF advice. Domestic politics and the ideological ideas
of the privatizers seem like a more realistic explanation.
The criticism by Stiglitz elicited a sharp response fi*om Anders Aslund. He said,
“Stiglitz is a striking embarrassment to himself and the World Bank. Without knowing
anything, he mouths any stupidity that comes to his head.” {The Economist^ 9/18/1999 p
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81) What is clear is that Russia was not unduly constrained by IMF conditionality. In
fact, in the view of Gaidar, more conditionality would have been a good thing.
This paper focuses specifically on the question of western advisors in relation to
privatization policy. Here again, westerners advised, but Russian policy makers were
driven to make choices based on domestic political considerations, particularly the need
to prevent a communist return to power.
The following quote comes fi*om Marshall Goldman in his 2003 book The
Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry. In it, Goldman gives his account of
the influences on Gaidar as he set privatization policy.
“Gaider had come to this concept[shock therapy and rapid privatization] as a
result of his studies as well as fi-om a series of discussions with economists from
both Eastern Europe and the United States. Among those interacting with Gaider
at one stage or another were Jeffery Sachs, Ajidrei Shliefer, Jonathan Hays, all of
Harvard University, Anders Aslund of Sweden, and, later. The Carnegie
Endowment and Richard Layard ofthe London School of Economics. IMF
officials and Stanley Fischer in particular had long advocated something similar”
(Goldman, 59).
Most of those names will be present below, as well as their writings on the period.
In his 1995 work How Russia became a Market Economy Anders Aslund, a
Swedish economist and transition expert says,“The 500 day program established the
need for fast, massive privatization”(Aslund, 226). This quote references a plan
prepared for Mikhail Gorbachev during the summer of 1990(Aslund, 324). The group,
lead by Sergei Shatalin shows a domestic source for ideas on privatization, particularly a
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shock therapy model. Yegor Gaidar, who served briefly as Prime Minister under Yeltsin,
and Anatoly Chubais, the head ofthe State Privatization Office both worked with and
were supervised by Shatalin.(Gaidar, 27,52)
“The Russian decision makers looked at privatization in Poland primarily to learn
what pitfalls to avoid and at Czechoslovakia to learn how to do it. At the same time, they
were acutely aware of Russian peculiarities, such as the highly corrupt state
administration”(Aslund, 229).
While there certainly were westerners involved, they were not in policy making
positions. Aslimd continues,“the main explanation for successful western assistance to
Russian privatization is that the leading Russian privatizers, Chubais, and his deputy
Demetry Vasil’ev, knew what kind of policy they wanted. They instructed their advisors
about a policy framework, and the advisors were not permitted to act as an interest
group.” He continues “Theirjob was to provide the government with useful advice
within the parameters of the government policy”(Aslund, 247-248).
The 1995 work Privatizing Russia by Maxim Boyco, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny is another example of advisors telling the story of privatization. The authors go
into great detail about both the process by which the Russian government made its
decision for voucher privatization and the specific method by which it was conducted.
During this discussion advisors are mentioned rarely.
The first mention of advice runs directly counter to the policy which was
eventually adopted.

Indeed, the assorted investment bankers giving advice in

Russia...advocated case-by-case privatization through cash sales”(Boyco, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 70). In direct contrast to this advice the Russian government chose to adopt
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mass voucher privatization. The next mention of western advisors is a similar case of
rejection, although not of direct advice, The idea ofrevaluing Russian companies using
proper accounting methods and adjusting for inflation appealed to many westerners”
((Boyco, Shleifer, and Vishny, 75). Instead Russian leaders chose to set the June 1 1992
value as the “correct” value.
The justification given at the time was that revaluing the every Russian company
would take too long and would leave the process open to massive corruption. While a
certain measure of chaos and chicanery was anticipated by the designers ofthe voucher
auction process, the belief was that by making the process as simple and transparent as
possible it could be kept to a minimum. Requiring a massive bureaucracy to set a value
for each and every company would have made the process highly opaque and extremely
expensive in terms of bribes demanded.
Once again, advice was disregarded because ofthe perceived problems of
Russia’s domestic situation.
The final mention is a description of how a third option for privatizing enterprises
would function. This option was not popular with those responsible for desigmng the
privatization plan, and had been added at the behest ofthe legislature. In order to
discourage enterprises from adopting it, the statue had purposely been written in typical
Russian bureaucratese” and that “Chubais’s advisors did not volunteer to clarify the
language ofthese regulations”(Boyco, Shleifer, and Vishny, 79). Chubais and his
associates chose not to clarify it in order to discourage enterprise directors from adopting
it. The fact that advisors are mentioned rarely, and most often having their advice
ignored, is striking.
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In that chapter about process and formulation ofthe voucher strategy the authors
also say, “they did what they were supposed to do, namely assure that there would be no
turning back on privatization”(Boyco, Shleifer, and Vishny, 84). The creation of a
durable and large class of private owners was seen as one ofthe most effective guards
against any return ofthe communist party to power. Whatever arguments might be made
on the grounds of economic efficiency, this justification was one ofthe most important.
Gaidar, the primary policy advisor to President Yeltsin, provided some
illumination into how his thoughts on the subject developed. “In general, most of my
colleagues and I, including Anatoly Chubais, were skeptical ofintroducing special
payment notes- later known as “vouchers”(Gaider, 75). “We wanted to do things the
way they do them in western countries (case by case sales) but we would miss the
window of opportunity when a breakthrough in restructuring property relations was still
possible.” Again,the feeling oftime pressure forced Russian policy makers to adopt a
prescription that they were not completely comfortable with. Also, as was noted above,
the swift voucher auctions ran counter to western advice at the time, that is, privatize
through cash sales. The plan that was adopted bears a much closer resemblance to those
created by the young reformers during the waning days of communism than plans being
suggested by western experts or implemented at that very time in Poland.
These words fi'om western and Russian participants indicate that Russians
examined evidence oftheir neighbors, as well as pre-existing plans, and settled on the
best course of action they believed was available to them. This same conclusion has not
been reached by all who have examined the evidence, however.
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One highly stringent critique of both the advice and advisors comes from Dr.
Janine Wedel. In her book, Collision and Collusion, she levels a variety of charges at
most participants in the Eastern European transition economies. These charges range
from incompetence all the way to corruption, insider dealing, and influence peddling
(Wedel 59, 123, 151).
Wedel places a great deal of weight on a series of meetings that allegedly
occurred during the late summer and fall of 1991. These meetings had Jeffery Sachs,
Andrei Shleifer and Anders Aslund meeting with Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais at a
dacha outside Moscow. These dacha discussions of policy are supposed to have paved
the way for the power later wielded by the “Chubais clan,

It is interesting to note that in

his book on the period Gaidar does mention spending the summer working at the dacha,
but makes no mention of Sach’s visits. Whether he failed to mention the visit to hide the
nefarious influence of westerners, or because it simply was not that important, it is
impossible to say.
Wedel points out that “Jonathan Hay and his associates actually drafted many of
the decrees”(Wedel, 112). This ignores the fact that Jonathon Hay was in the employ of
the Russian government at this time, and that he was operating within the instructions of
his superiors, Russian policy makers.
She goes on to claim in a later chapter that noted investor and philanthropist
George Soros used a large loan to the Russian government to obtain preferential rights in
the bidding for a 25 percent stake in Svyazinvest, a new telephone holding company.
David Hoffman, Washington Post Moscow Bureau Chief, spends a chapter in his book
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The Oligarchs describing this auction. He finds that the transaction was one ofthe only
legitimate privatization auctions to occur.
Finally, it should be noted that Goldman, hardly an admirer of Sachs and
company says, in reference to Sachs,“Ms. Wedel seems obsessed with attacking the
man.

He also calls some of her charges,“excessively emotional, even reckless”

(Goldman,60). Nevertheless, her charges of undue influence are worth considering, even
if they do not appear to have any weight.
In general, there is no consensus on the role of western advice in the formulation
of Russian privatization policy. Some Russian and western participants maintain that the
process was guided by Russians. Others, including some advisors and observers, contend
that western advisors were responsible for guiding and shaping privatization policy
throughout its course. Time and again western advice was rejected or modified in the
interests of domestic political and policy implications. Western advice to conduct case
by case privatization was ignored because ofthe need to purchase public support of the
privatization program. One ofthe most important pieces of advice was to pursue a tight
monetary policy. This was abandoned in order to mollify domestic critics ofthe Yeltsin
regime. Even “loans for shares” began life as a western created plan, only to be reshaped
by domestic business interests in a bid to gain greater wealth and control.
Russian decision makers had their own pre-existing ideas, as far back as the late
Soviet period, about the desirability of a mass privatization model. When it came time to
implement those policies they certainly accepted western advice and assistance, but only
as it served the goals that Russians had set for themselves. Perhaps most importantly,
these economic decisions were also political ones. The ability to pursue reform had to be
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passed through a frequently hostile legislature while preventing an anti-system party from
achieving electoral success. These considerations were paramount in the minds of policy
makers.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions.
What role did western advice play in shaping Russian privatization policy in the
period from Yeltsin’s rise to the August 19 1998 currency collapse? From the evidence it
appears that Russians charted their own course. They accepted advice where it
conformed to domestic policymakers ideas and needs, but rejecting it when it did not suit
them. Furthermore, when accepting assistance from westerners, policy makers
maintained control ofthe process. Each major period of Russian reform includes
examples ofthis phenomenon.
During the initial planning for privatization a mass privatization voucher model
was adopted. This is in contrast to the experience and advice of western advisors.
However, it is in perfect keeping with preexisting domestic plans such as the 500 day
plan.
The Russian government repeatedly ignored or avoided complying with IMF
conditionality and requirements. Contrary to the advice and urging of the IMF Russia
pursued a loose monetEiry policy and failed to reform its bankruptcy or trade rules. Much
has been made ofthe fact that the IMF urged rapid privatization as well. However, that
is the only piece of advice Russia seems to have accepted. The question must be asked
whether Russia truly accepted the advice, or just happened to pursing a policy that
conformed to what was being advised.
Even the most egregious example ofthe ”piratization

of Russia, the loans for

shares auctions, began life as a piece of western advice. Boris Jordan helped create the
plan itself, and insists that his recommendations required that the auctions be transparent
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and open. This advice was not taken, and Russia ended up using a series of notoriously
corrupt auctions to transfer billions of dollars of wealth in return for almost nothing.
What explanation then can be given for the choices that were made by Russian
policy makers? Were they simply corrupt? The evidence suggests otherwise. Domestic
politics were highly unsettled during the period in question (1992-1998), and the danger
of a communist return to power was never far from the minds ofthe reformers. Each
seemingly irrational step can be traced to some domestic policy decision.
When enterprise managers and workers were allowed to capture over half their
enterprises in voucher privatization the explanation was the need to build a political
consensus behind privatization. When a tight money central banker was replaced in the
middle ofthe drive to stop hyperinflation, the explanation was a need to mollify Yeltsin’s
critics in the legislature. When the crown jewels ofthe Russian economies extractive
industries were sold for a pittance the explanation was a need to raise funds to pay back
wages in anticipation ofthe 1996 presidential elections.
Western advisors did play a role in helping to shape privatization policy, but no
where near as important a role as the traditional understanding ofthe story would
suggest. Russian policy makers shaped their own policy, seeking input from westerners
surely, but never directed or controlled by them.
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Appendix I- Additional examples of privatization
The claim that privatization marked a radical and different policy completely
foreign to British politics is certainly easy claim to make. The term itself wasn’t even
included in the dictionary in 1979, on the eve ofthe first Thatcher victory. However, a
closer reading of the events that followed show that privatization wasn’t the primary goal
of the administration, at least initially. Ascui, McAllister and Studlar say “‘privatization’,
however, played a relatively small role in Thatcher’s initial program.”(Ascui,
McAllister, Studlar, 1990; 1080) Relatively few enterprises and shares were sold during
the first Thatcher term, amounting to roughly 500 million pounds per year. Even those
sales were conducted ofrelatively healthy companies in competitive industries that had
never really become part ofthe public sector.(Burton, 1987; 23-24) It should be noted,
however, that the above figure does not include the sale of state owned housing to
tenants. Mitchell also goes on to point out that due to British governmental accoimting
rules, sales of privatized assets could be counted as negative financial flows, and help the
government hit its targets for public sector reduction.
Mitchell launches a stringent attack on the entire “story of Thatcher led
privatization by saying;
“Despite the retrospective presentation of privatization as some coherent, well
thought out plan of action, it was a program which the Conservatives staggered
towards as they encountered difficulties in financing capital expenditure
programs, allied with a recognition ofthe potential ofthe populist nature of
privatization.”(Mitchell, 1990; 21)
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This argument runs directly counter to what Crewe and Searle claim. Based on
their analysis of survey results from the era before Thatcher, they find that very few
people actually identified with the policy solution of privatization. Even among
Conservatives fewer than 50% agreed with the notion of de-nationalization(Crewe Searle
374). In particular consider this quote from the above,“When after 1974, she and Sir
Keith Joseph began to articulate the ideology, they very self-consciously moved away
from the electoral center” and “Not since Gladstone has a prime minister held so many
personal political convictions and sought to use the office to persuade the electorate of
their truth”(Crewe, Searle 374-375). It is difficult to understand how a government
could simultaneously “lurch towards” an idea that less than a majority oftheir own
followers supported and simultaneously have been propounding it for over five years.
While certainly some ofthe issue can be explained away by differences in terminology
there still exists a fundamental difference in the view of the story.
Based upon the research assembled for this paper, it seems clear that Mrs.
Thatcher intended from the beginning of her political career to undertake radical changes
in the role ofthe state in business. Whether that specific policy solution proposed in
1975 was privatization is unknown. Still, to say that Thatcher fell into privatization
because of accounting rules and a budget shortfall seems a highly problematic claim.
Privatization as such hit its stride during the Thatcher government s second term,
resulting in over 5.5 billion pounds per year being added to the public coffers (Mitchell
24). Massive chunks of previously public monopolies were transformed into private
corporations subject to regulation. As we have already, seen some scholars remain
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ambivalent about the value oftransforming one type of monopoly into another.
Nonetheless, the government and the market clearly supported the measures.
With the great share sales ofthe second and third terms, the Thatcher government
transformed the English economy. One clear example is trade umon membership, which
peaked in 1979 at 54% of workers. At the end of 1987 it had fallen to 42% ofthe
workforce(Towers 174). For the first time ever stock holders were expected to
outnumber trade union members in the 1987 general election. This radical
transformation ofthe British populace, and economy,is the largest lasting legacy ofthe
Thatcher Revolution.
Britain was not the only nation during the 1980s to adopt privatization measures
as a means ofimproving growth and services. As was previously mentioned, states from
all over the world considered the British example, and by varying degrees adopted
proposals to emulate them.
Malaysia offers an interesting comparison to Britain. Both states voluntarily
adopted privatization measures as a means to improve efficiency and services, save
public monies, and end the “subsidy mentality.”(Milne, 1986; 1374) The example of
Britain was followed in the method by which Malaysia began their program, that is,
under the direction of a strong central leader. In 1983, Dr. Mahathir, the Premier,
proposed a package of six proposals meant to stimulate growth. One ofthese proposals
was privatization. When commenting in 1986 Milne says that the policy is radically
changing the economy.”
The list of firms that Malaysia sought to sell was a long and varied one. For
instance, Milne includes everything from airlines and ports to telecommunication and
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television. Housing, mail, water, and electricity were just a few ofthe many properties
on the list(Milne 1375). This is another example of a natively organized and directed
drive to divest the state ofeconomic properties through privatization, well before the fall
of the fall ofthe Soviet Union.
It must be noted, however, that the Malaysian case is not a total copy of
Thatcher’s Britain. Faced with a radically more complicated religious picture, as well as
widespread poverty, Malaysia is pursuing goals which differ drastically from those of
industrialized Britain. One specific example is one ofthe goals of privatization; to raise
money for the expansion ofthe manufacturing sector(Milne 1378). Another difference is
the ethnic dimension ofthe varied Malaysian population. The following highly unique
arrangement has come into effect:
Another facet of privatization that has emerged is that, apart from management,
the forms of ownership by Bumiputeras, are changing. While in the past large
institutions such as MARA and PERNAS not only managed but also owned on
behalf of the Bumiputeras, an increasing percentage of such holdings is now
vested in the Permodalan Nasional (National Equity Corporation) and its main
subsidiary, ASN (Amanah Saham Nasional, National Trust Scheme)in which
individual Bumiputeras have shares (Milne 1376).
The nature ofthe Malay population caused these special institutions (minority
property funds)to be created in the post independence system. Now they have found a
way to adapt their institutions to a changed situation. This method of share distribution,
while dissimilar on the face to Russian voucher privatization, has the same goal. It
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sought to insure that everyone at least had the opportunity to participate in the ownership
economy.
A third example of nationally led privatization effort comes from Iraq.
Immediately following his takeover ofthe government in 1979 Saddam Hussein
promised rural populations an increase in production from the countryside. While
changes immediately followed, actual revision to ownership were not formalized xmtil
Law 35 of 1983. The change made by that document allowed private citizens to
accumulate and lease land in excess ofthe previous official ceiling (Springborg 16).
In an effort to show just how extensively the prescription of privatization was
applied throughout the world, consider the following two examples. In 1984 and 1985
Bolivia experienced arguably the worst inflation in history. Between April 1984 and
September 1985 Bolivia experienced at least 50 percent inflation per month (Sachs, 279).
In response to this crisis a New Economic Policy was proposed by the newly elected
President Paz. At a time when his nation’s currency was truly desperate straits. President
Paz took the time to include “privatization of public enterprises” in his list of economic
policies (Sachs, 280).
It would be hard to locate a nation more different from Bolivia than Bhutan. The
small Himalayan nation is tucked between two giants, China and India. This archaic
monarchy has largely existed beyond the scope of the modem economy. Consider that
“until the late 1970s, the production of gimmicky stamps by Bhutan’s postal service was
the principal source offoreign exchange”(Samarasinghe, 568). With that fact in mind,
consider the following statement;
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...partly guided by the IMF, which Bhutan joined in 1981, the government is
implementing a cautious policy of privatization in order to keep government expenditures
under control and at the same time encourage an entrepreneurial class.”(Samarasinghe,
1990; 574)
A nation that experienced brutal hyperinflation and needed desperate credit from
the international community, and a nation with an industrial sector which can be
measured in the thousands of employees were given the same advice by the World Bank
and IMF.
Whether this advice was given for ideological or fact based research reasons
remains to be seen. What can seen clearly is at least two facts. Nations do adopt
privatization as a policy prescription on their own. Furthermore, those that don’t(and
which require IMF assistance) will almost certainly have it recommended to them.
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